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Abstract 
A nation of one billion people, India is often recognized as the world’s largest 
democracy. The ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity in India creates a unique 
collection of voters whose divisions are not only brought about due to differences in 
ideological preferences, but also as a result of various caste and ethnic divisions that 
remain strongly ingrained in modern Indian society. Indian political parties must not only 
be able to gain voter confidence through the production and presentation of sound 
ideology, but also must struggle to help relate this ideology to a much divided and 
ethnically stratified voter base. This social construct has led to the rise of various political 
parties in India whose political agenda is to cater specifically to unique ethnic groups and 
minorities, while at times having to form political alliances gain power (Jana & Sarmah, 
2002, 1). This study will analyze the rise of one such Indian political party formally 
established as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh. More 
specifically, it will address the following question: Has engaging in party coalitions 
caused the BSP to sacrifice its ideology in the arena of Uttar Pradesh Politics? 
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Introduction 
Why Uttar Pradesh? 
Uttar Pradesh is a state in the northern region of India bordering the state of Delhi 
and the country of Nepal to its east. With a population of nearly 200 million people, Uttar 
Pradesh is the most populace state in all of India and has struggled to prosper, with one of 
the highest infant mortality rates in the country (Dhankani, 2010). Approximately one-
third of its population lives below the poverty line and the state has the highest amount of 
children who drop out of school to find labor (Dhankani, 2010). The BSP has grown 
quite effectively over the years, but has experienced the most popularity and development 
of political will in the state of Uttar Pradesh.  
Perhaps one reason for the BSP’s ascendancy in Uttar Pradesh was due to the fact 
that the Scheduled Caste population of Uttar Pradesh constitutes approximately 28.9 
percent of the state’s population (National Commission for Scheduled Castes, 2013). This 
is the largest Scheduled Caste (SC) population of any state, making it the perfect 
breeding ground for a political party that caters specifically to this caste groups 
economic, political, and social interests. Uttar Pradesh has historically had a large SC 
population, but the SC and Other Backwards Castes (OBCs) were never able to unify in 
neither a potent nor organized manner (Pai, 2004, 1589). The other main challenge was 
supplanting the dominant party of the state, Congress. Table 1 below shows the 
chronology of Chief Ministers in the state of Uttar Pradesh. In addition, it provides the 
time periods during which the BSP was in power.  
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Table 1.1 Chronology of chief ministers in the state of Uttar Pradesh  
S No Name Took Office Demit Office Political Party 
1 Govind Ballabh Pant 26-Jan-50 20-May-52 Indian National Congress 
2 Govind Ballabh Pant 20-May-52 27-Dec-54 Indian National Congress 
3 Sampurnanand 28-Dec-54 9-Apr-57 Indian National Congress 
4 Sampurnanand 10-Apr-57 6-Dec-60 Indian National Congress 
5 Chandra Bhanu Gupta 7-Dec-60 14-Apr-62 Indian National Congress 
6 Chandra Bhanu Gupta 14-Apr-62 1-Oct-63 Indian National Congress 
7 Sucheta Kriplani 2-Oct-63 13-Mar-67 Indian National Congress 
8 Chandra Bhanu Gupta 14-Mar-67 2-Apr-67 Indian National Congress 
9 Charan Singh 3-Apr-67 25-Feb-68 Bharatiya Lok Dal 
10 President`s Rule 17-Feb-68 26-Feb-69   
11 Chandra Bhanu Gupta  26-Feb-69 17-Feb-70 Indian National Congress 
12 Charan Singh 18-Feb-70 1-Oct-70 Bharatiya Lok Dal 
13 President`s Rule 2-Oct-70 18-Oct-70   
14 Tribhuvana Narayana 
Singh 
18-Oct-70 3-Apr-71 Indian National Congress 
15 Kamalapati Tripathi 4-Apr-71 12-Jun-73 Indian National Congress 
16 President`s Rule 12-Jun-73 8-Nov-73   
17 Hemwati Nandan 
Bahuguna 
8-Nov-73 4-Apr-74 Indian National Congress 
18 President`s Rule 5-Apr-74 29-Nov-75   
19 President`s Rule 30-Nov-75 21-Jan-76   
20 Narayan Dutt Tiwari 21-Jan-76 30-Apr-77 Indian National Congress 
21 President`s Rule 30-Apr-77 23-Jun-77   
22 Ram Naresh Yadav 23-Jun-77 27-Feb-79 Janata Party 
23 Banarsi Das 28-Feb-79 17-Feb-80 Janata Party 
24 President`s Rule 17-Feb-80 9-Jun-80   
25 Vishwanath Pratap Singh 9-Jun-80 18-Jul-82 Indian National Congress 
26 Sripati Mishra 19-Jul-82 2-Aug-84 Indian National Congress 
27 Narayan Dutt Tiwari  3-Aug-84 10-Mar-85 Indian National Congress 
28 President`s Rule 11-Mar-85 24-Sep-85   
29 Vir Bahadur Singh 24-Sep-85 24-Jun-88 Indian National Congress 
30 Narayan Dutt Tiwari  25-Jun-88 5-Dec-89 Indian National Congress 
31 Mulayam Singh Yadav 5-Dec-89 24-Jun-91 Janata Dal 
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32 Kalyan Singh 24-Jun-91 6-Dec-92 Bharatiya Janata Party 
33 President`s Rule 6-Dec-92 4-Dec-93   
34 Mulayam Singh 4-Dec-93 3-Jun-95 Samajwadi Party 
35 Mayawati 3-Jun-95 18-Oct-95 Bahujan Samaj Party 
36 President`s Rule 18-Oct-95 21-Mar-97   
37 Mayawati  21-Mar-97 21-Sep-97 Bahujan Samaj Party 
38 Kalyan Singh  21-Sep-97 21-Feb-98 Bharatiya Janata Party 
39 Jagdambika Pal 21-Feb-98 23-Feb-98 Indian National Congress 
40 Kalyan Singh  21-Feb-98 12-Nov-99 Bharatiya Janata Party 
41 Ram Prakash Gupta 12-Nov-99 28-Oct-00 Bharatiya Janata Party 
42 Rajnath Singh 28-Oct-00 8-Mar-02 Bharatiya Janata Party 
43 President`s Rule 8-Mar-02 3-May-02   
44 Mayawati  3-May-02 29-Aug-03 Bahujan Samaj Party 
45 Mulayam Singh Yadav  29-Aug-03 13-May-07 Samajwadi Party 
46 Mayawati  13-May-07 7-March 2012 Bahujan Samaj Party 
(Zee Research Group, Zeenews.India.com) 
Based on the history of elections in Uttar Pradesh, it can be seen that the Congress 
party has taken 19 out of 37 contested elections, taking into consideration that there were 
10 instances of President’s rule. It is clear that the apex of BSP political power has been 
from 1995-2012.  
This sudden rise of the BSP makes it a unique party to study. As will be 
established in future chapters, Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh vote almost exclusively 
for the BSP. There has been a shift in confidence and high levels of lower caste political 
mobilization that has allowed the BSP to gain power and sway in the state. The BSP’s 
wide range of political coalitions have obviously helped the party gain influence and 
control in various states, but in order to gain this newer, more powerful political status, 
has it sacrificed the very principles that made it such a popular and earnest party for the 
lower castes to follow?  
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The Bahujan Samaj Party and its Unique History 
 
Dalits or “ex-untouchables”, and backwards castes as a whole comprise a 
stunning 52 percent of India’s population (Ghose, 2003, 83).  From the years 1930 to 
1950 a social activist named Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar introduced a new form of leadership 
involving grassroots level work, striving to address the concerns of lower caste 
“untouchables” in India who had historically been oppressed both socially and 
economically (Jaffrelot, 1998, 35). Dr. Ambedkar’s struggles and eventual passing led to 
the rise of a new leader, Kanshi Ram, who aimed to unite lower castes through social 
work and eventually began focusing the bulk of his organizational efforts in the building 
of the political party that is known today as the BSP (Jaffrelot, 1998, 35).   
Prior to formally being established as the BSP, the party went through a wide 
range of changes. As of 1971, Kanshi Ram had established “The Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Minority Communities Employees 
Association,” which served to unite various employees in districts who were considered 
to be under the lower caste umbrella (Jaffrelot, 1998, 36). It can be seen that Kanshi 
Ram’s initial work revolved heavily around the ideas of social transformation and 
economic freedom for lower castes. However he quickly realized that these goals were 
difficult to attain without major political backing and lower caste unification (Jaffrelot, 
1998, 37).  
The Bahujan Samaj Party was then officially formed on April 14
th
, 1984, allowing 
for the official shift of organizational focus from social work to party politics. In the 
legislative assembly elections of 1985 for the state of Uttar Pradesh the BSP contested the 
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majority of the seats and won a meager 2.5 percent of the vote (Duncan, 1999, p. 40). 
However, the party’s subsequent growth allowed it to obtain the title of National Party 
from the Election Commission of India (Jaffrelot, 1998, 37).  The next two decades saw 
the BSP experience rapid growth and influence in the arena of party politics and the 
implementation of policy aimed at aiding the Dalit and backward caste struggle, most 
prominently in the state of Uttar Pradesh.  
Political Coalitions 
 
The BSP’s electoral success is seen as a unique phenomenon due to the fact that 
no other Indian political party running primarily under the platform of catering to the 
interests of ex-untouchables has achieved such success (Duncan, 1999, 36). However, the 
BSP could not have achieved success by simple voter majority because Dalits and other 
backwards castes (OBCs) do not comprise a direct voter majority. The BSP has found 
success by forming political coalitions with the Samajvadi Party (SP), Congress, 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), all of which have very different political ideologies and 
agendas than those of the BSP (Duncan, 1999, 44). The major question to address is 
whether the formation of these political coalitions has led to the BSP having to sacrifice 
its ideology for seats and political power at both the state and national level.  
The BSP-SP government from 1993-1995 began to fade quickly after its inception 
as the contradictions between the lower castes and middle classes began to come to 
surface. As a result clashes between BSP and SP supporters began to increase at the 
grassroots level (Jana & Sarmah, 2002, 245). The leader of the SP, Mulayam Singh 
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Yadav began a process referred to by the BSP as “Yadavization” in which Yadav pushed 
for defecting against various members of the legislative assembly, leading to the creation 
of anti-SP propaganda spread by the BSP (Jana & Sarmah, 2002, 246).  
Soon after the failure of the BSP-SP coalition, the BSP entered into a political 
alliance with the BJP, making rising political figure Mayawati the first female Dalit to 
become the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati’s tenure as Chief Minister of 
Uttar Pradesh will be of significant focus throughout this study, as many changes were 
effected during her administration that pose questions concerning political coalitions and 
BSP ideology. While the political alliance between the BSP and BJP was surprising, it 
displayed the political strategy of the BSP. The alliance would aid in exerting more 
influence and power in the region, while the BJP allied to gain more Dalit support. This 
was a trap specifically set by the BSP so that if the BJP were to back out of the alliance, 
they would risk being labeled as biased against the lower castes (Jana & Sarmah, 2002, 
247).  
These various coalitions are important to analyze not only because they give 
critical insight to the political and electoral strategies of the BSP, but more importantly 
provide a framework of analysis to evaluate and investigate changes in BSP ideology 
throughout each period of political alliance. Did the specific type of alliance lead to 
different forms of ideological change? How did the era of the specific alliance affect the 
implementation of BSP ideology through tangible, legislative action? Answering these 
questions will help address how significant ideology is to the BSP relative to its need for 
political coalitions.  
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What is BSP Ideology? 
 
In order to understand the potential changes in BSP ideology and the various 
actions taken by the BSP in recent decades, information regarding the ideology must be 
established. The political ideology of the BSP has a very strong egalitarian nature and 
strives to create equal opportunity for the oppressed Dalit, Scheduled Caste (SC), and 
other backwards caste (OBC) population. The ideology is deeply rooted in themes 
concerning equality, economic and social independence, and bringing about change 
within the “system.” The BSP’s voter base is cognizant of the party’s strong stance on 
issues concerning social justice, which has made it one of the most popular parties for 
underrepresented, oppressed, and lower caste communities.  
Kanchan Chandra of New York University performed a statistical analysis which 
aimed to determine whether a party had taken an official stance on an issue. This was 
done by obtaining a sample consisting of “public statements by prominent party leaders, 
including campaign speeches, radio broadcasts, slogans, press conferences, and 
statements made during interviews” while excluding party literature not meant for a mass 
audience (Chandra, 2004, 201). This is because the data was meant to be focused on 
statements that voters have access to on a broad and common level. The data was chosen 
from a random 9 of the 36 days of the official campaign period that lasted from April 7
th
 
to May 12
th
, 1996. 
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Table 1.2 Party issue positions, 1996  
Issue Congress Bharatiya 
Janata 
Party 
National/Left 
Front 
Akali Dal BSP 
Good 
governance 
95.4 30.5 57.2 52.2 0 
Price rise .92 1.5 3.0 0 0 
Nationalism 5.53 41.4 0 0 0 
Social justice 2.3 3.4 10.7 0 91.6 
Local issues 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1.38 5.4 8.4 30.4 4.2 
(Chandra, 2004, 204). 
The results of the study indicated in table 1.2 above, showed that the BSP 
mentioned issues pertaining to social justice 91.6 percent of the time. Social justice and 
the process of social transformation dominate BSP’s political discourse. The incredible 
importance placed on this issue will play a key role when later analyzing whether the 
BSP lives up to its hard stance on its ideology. The party has explicitly stated its ideology 
on its official website, which is also addressed in the BSP constitution and has 
enumerated various points that encompass its ideology for the public to access. Below are 
some important excerpts of the party constitution that highlight the BSP’s political 
mentality. 
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“1. That all citizens of India being equal before law are entitled to be treated as 
equal in true sense and in all matters and all walks of life, and where equality does not exist 
it has to be fostered and where equality is denied it has to be upheld and fought for” (BSP,  
4). 
“The party shall work for these down trodden masses to- remove their 
backwardness; to fight against their oppression and exploitation; to improve their status in 
society and public life; to improve their living conditions in day to day life” (BSP, 5). 
“The social structure of India is based on inequalities created by caste system and 
the movement of the Party shall be geared towards changing the social system and rebuild it 
on the basis of equality and human values” (BSP, 5).  
These explicitly stated proclamations within the BSP constitution provide for an 
excellent reference when analyzing BSP ideology through time periods and political 
coalitions. Have these political coalitions and various power struggles within national and 
state elections forced the BSP to contradict the very beliefs that they were founded upon? 
The BSP’s rallying cry has famously been “85 percent living under the rule of 15 percent, 
this will not last, this will not last” (Jaffrelot, 1998, 38). This theme has consistently been 
that of the call for unification of those that experience social and economic injustice. 
Figure 1 below, often reproduced in BSP speeches and publications, visually displays 
where various caste groups fall into the “oppressed” region and into the “Bahujan Samaj” 
(Chandra, 2004, 156).  
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Figure 1.1 BSP claimed “social system” as a product of Brahminism (Chandra, 2004, 
156). 
 
Beneficiaries of the system Brahmins 
 (10-15)% 
                                                              Kshatriya  
                                                              Vaishya 
 
 Victims of the System                      Intermediary Castes 
              (85-90%) 
      Other Backward Castes (OBCs)  
                                                                                        
      Scheduled Cases (SC) 
      Scheduled Tribes 
 
Relevant Introductory Data 
 
 The BSP has been specifically chosen as the party of interest in this study because 
of its rapid growth and rise into one of India’s top national parties. The BSP has broken 
social and political barriers through its powerful political agenda and the shrewd politics 
of its leader, Mayawati, whose victory was the first time a Dalit-led party won a state 
election as a singlehanded majority (Sengupta, 2007, 6). This rise in standing can be seen 
from the data provided in table 1.4 and figure 1.2. 
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 First, to put in perspective the type of demographic that the BSP has captured, the 
table below describes the occupation and literacy rates among the Scheduled Castes 
(SCs), who comprise the vast majority of BSP voters, versus the occupations and literacy 
rates amongst non-Scheduled Castes (non-SCs). Table 1 makes it clear that the SC has a 
considerably lower literacy rate compared to that of the non-SC. Additionally, most of 
the SC work as agricultural laborers compared to cultivators, a key indicator of economic 
inferiority.  
Table 1.3 Comparative figures of scheduled caste (SC) and non-scheduled caste (non-
SC) population in Uttar Pradesh  
 SC Non-SC 
Working as cultivators in 
rural areas 
46.7 68.5 
Working as agricultural 
laborers in  rural areas 
41.3 14.8 
Urban population 11.8 22.0 
Literacy (all) 21.1 36.4 
Literacy (urban men) 43.9 59.4 
Literacy (urban women) 30.7 44.8 
Literacy (rural men) 21.5 43.5 
Literacy (rural women) 6.6 17.5 
(Duncan, 1999, 38) 
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Both table 1.4 and figure 1.2 show the positive trajectory of the BSP in terms of 
total votes and vote percentage in seats contested. This rapid upward trend occurred spans 
close to over three decades and in a mere 7 elections. For a party that is comprised of ex-
untouchables and one that has been formed much later than most prominent national 
parties in India to have accelerated at this rate, is quite remarkable. This data is 
representative of electoral trends and associated statistics in the state of Uttar Pradesh, the 
state in which the BSP has had the most electoral success (Sridharan, 2003, 149). 
Table 1.4 Electoral performance of BSP in Uttar Pradesh state Assembly elections from 
1989-2012  
Year Contested Won FD Votes % of 
Total 
Votes 
Vote % in 
Seats 
Contested 
1989 372 13 282 3,664,417 9.41 10.42 
1991 386 12 299 3,532,683 9.44 10.26 
1993 164 67 40 5,554,076 11.12 28.53 
1996 296 67 28 10,890,716 19.64 27.73 
2002 401 98 91 12,374,388 23.06 23.19 
2007 403 206 36 15,872,561 30.43 30.43 
2012 403 80 51 19,647,303 25.91 25.95 
(Election Commission of India) 
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Figure 1.2 Performance of BSP in Uttar Pradesh State Legislative Assembly Elections 
from 1989-2012 (Election Commission of India). 
Methodology  
  Throughout this study, various methods will be employed in order to reach a firm 
and educated conclusion involving BSP ideological changes in accordance with the 
various political coalitions that have been formed in the BSP’s active history. First, the 
different periods of BSP prominence in Uttar Pradesh will be identified using data from 
the Electoral Commission of India concerning election results. Analyzing election results 
for the state of Uttar Pradesh will aid in laying the foundation for juxtaposing BSP 
success in relation to ideology across various states and regions.  
This is significant because it allows for more accurately investigating the BSP’s 
numerous courses of action and how their political strategies concerning ideology may 
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vary across different demographics in different states. It would be of importance to see 
whether the BSP caters its ideological message in a unified manner or whether it must 
defer due to political pressure when aligning itself with another party. 
  When the period of BSP control has been determined, thorough analysis will be 
completed in evaluating the type of political coalition that the BSP had engaged in along 
with which specific party it had joined forces with. The focus will be on the relationship 
between the two parties throughout the tenure of the administration. The analysis will 
address for example, questions concerning the party agenda and whether dissension led to 
specific political action. 
The next feature of the study is perhaps the most important. For each BSP 
contested election in which a party coalition was formed, an examination of BSP policy 
throughout the period will be completed. This will then later be contrasted with instances 
of a BSP led government that has been formed without the potential advantage of a party 
coalition. This will then be followed by an analysis of political action and ideological 
stance during those administrations. Figure 1.3 visually displays the process that will be 
applied to case study so that sound conclusions can be formed in regards to the effect of 
coalitions on BSP ideology.  
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Figure 1.3 Methodological process for BSP coalition case studies 
 
While ideological shifts within the BSP can be mapped by simply comparing 
party action to the BSP constitution, juxtaposing BSP governments formed with the help 
of party coalitions versus those formed without coalitions provides for a stable control 
group. The study can then more accurately analyze to what extent party coalitions affect 
BSP ideology, and if whether these coalitions affect ideology at all. This method of 
analysis will help establish the last phase of the study in which patterns of ideological 
action within BSP political coalitions will be contrasted with the 2007 BSP led 
government in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which achieved victory without any coalition 
partners (Sengupta, 2007, 6). The 2007 government led by chief minister Kumari 
Mayawati will serve as the control group in the study.  
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Literature Review 
 A myriad of resources will be used throughout this study in order to properly 
analyze BSP ideology. A combination of scholarly articles, professional journal 
publications, books, interviews, newspaper archives, and original BSP documents will aid 
in answering the overarching research questions posed throughout the study. The 
literature review will serve to help identify a collection of various sources in terms of 
their importance to the development of the study. 
Election Commission of India 
 The Election Commission of India is a permanent constitutional body that was 
established in 1950 in order to give authority for the supervision, direction, and control of 
the process for conducting elections in India. The website for the Election Commission of 
India will provide the majority of the raw data regarding election results. The website 
contains data regarding election results from the local to the national level. This data will 
be of particular interest when juxtaposing the BSP’s relative popularity across various 
states to its actual political success in those regions. This data will be investigated and 
presented in both tables and graphs throughout the study in order to make the argument 
that the BSP has risen and has a growing voter bank. In addition, data from the Election 
Commission of India will help argue the significance of the BSP-SP and BSP-BJP 
alliances. 
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India’s Silent Revolution by Christophe Jaffrelot 
 This specific book is integral to this study in order to study the foundations of the 
Dalit rise in India. Initially, the book breaks down the Congress party’s stronghold in 
India and in various regions in which the lower castes primarily resided in. This 
information will help set up the process of answering research questions concerning the 
differences in political climate before and after the rise of the BSP.  Jaffrelot extensively 
discusses the various divisions between the scheduled castes and OBCs and delves deeply 
into the importance of geography in the political shifts that occurred as a result. Most 
importantly however, Jaffrelot includes a detailed chapter directly addressing the BSP. 
The chapter is broken down into three major subsections.  
The first discusses the evolution of the BSP from a mere interest group to a 
political force. The second discusses the emergence of the BSP in different states 
focusing on the years 1989-1999 and how Kanshi Ram, the face of the BSP in the early 
phase of its rise, developed Dalit-dominant policy. The third and final section concerning 
the BSP provides integral information pertaining to the specific political alliances that the 
BSP engaged in, in order to merge the fragmented Dalit vote into one consistent voter 
base. This section is significant because the information extracted from it will help make 
the argument that the alliance that the BSP made with the Samajwadi and Bharatiya 
Janata Parties was a result of a purely opportunistic party strategy.  
Jaffrelot provides tables displaying statistics concerning atrocities committed 
against Dalits and the percentages of Dalit government employees. This information will 
be used to make arguments regarding what factors led to the unification of Dalits and 
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why did this occur during that specific time period. Furthermore, Mayawati’s victory as 
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh is analyzed. The information presented on Mayawati will 
be critical in analyzing whether or not BSP ideology was put into action and implemented 
throughout her tenure as Chief Minister.  
Why Ethnic Parties Succeed by Kanchan Chandra 
 Kanchan Chandra consistently frames her arguments in the context of theory 
followed by data to back up claims. Chandra’s work focuses directly on the BSP and the 
role of the various caste groups in making it an influential political party. Chandra breaks 
down the motivations behind BSP support amongst the lower caste, why their preferences 
have shifted, and why these preferences have translated into votes for the BSP. Chandra’s 
analysis contains comparative studies between the caste representation of the BSP across 
various time periods to numerically display the rising trend of Dalit and SC members 
joining the party. Most importantly however, her analysis attempts to isolate the BSP 
from the equation and attempt to decipher whether external events may have also played 
a role in rising BSP support. This perspective will be of great interest when arguing that 
participating in a coalition government helped the BSP lay its foundation as a political 
power in Uttar Pradesh.  
Dalits and Politics in Rural North India: The Bahujan Samaj Party in 
Uttar Pradesh by Ian Duncan 
 Ian Duncan’s paper sponsored by the Journal of Peasant Studies is a significantly 
valuable resource that will be consistently referred to throughout the study. Duncan 
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initially presents the socio-economic conditions surrounding Dalits and lower caste 
groups in the state of Uttar Pradesh. For example, data is given comparing literacy rates 
of both SC urban men and women and compared to those of non-SC men and women. 
Relevant statistics involving job occupations amongst the lower caste in Uttar Pradesh are 
presented. This data will be applicable when analyzing the specific pockets of BSP 
support and whether these statistics may change in the future if BSP ideology evolves and 
helps argue that ideology did not evolve due to circumstances involving party coalitions. 
When addressing whether BSP ideology has changed in the face of political coalition, 
implemented legislation will be examined. Statistics such as the ones provided in 
Duncan’s paper will give insight to the extent of such potential changes.  
Religion, Caste and Politics in India by Christophe Jaffrelot 
 This book will be used for an analysis of Mayawati’s 2007 BSP government in 
Uttar Pradesh. The text contains information essential to chapters 3 and 5 in this study, 
specifically in the context of the political action taken by Mayawati to improve the 
standing of the lower caste. Jaffrelot introduces information that will be directly relevant 
to the argument made that Mayawati’s actions as chief minister leading up to and during 
the 2007 administration was indeed different from her prior administrations in 1995, 
1997, 2002, and 2007. This text will help cement the argument that BSP ideology did 
indeed change over time.  
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Chapter 2: The BSP-Samajwadi Party 
(SP) Alliance 
The Samajwadi Party (SP) has seen success in Uttar Pradesh as the party chiefly 
representing the interests of OBCs. The party believes in creating a socialist society that 
combines emphasizing egalitarian principles in conjunction with a secular and democratic 
perspective (Samjwadi Party, 2012). The SP strongly believes in the “upliftment of 
weaker sections of society” and standing against communal forces (Samajwadi Party, 
2012). At first glance, the BSP and SP seem to have similar ideological interests as they 
strive to work for the weak and oppressed minorities. However, over time the Samajwadi 
party has attracted primarily OBCs while the BSP has developed a strong Dalit and 
Scheduled Caste voter base (Verma, 2004, 1509). In order to more accurately understand 
the complexity of the eventual relationship and political coalition between the BSP and 
SP, it is important to consider the SP’s roots.  
Brief History of the Samajwadi Party 
The SP was founded by Mulayam Singh Yadav in October 1992 (Verma, 2004, 
1509). Yadav was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Ram Manohar Lohia, an 
Indian nationalist political leader. The party heavily stresses the development and 
advancement of the common man, and has adopted the bicycle as its political symbol to 
reflect that philosophy (Samajwadi Party, 2012). The SP has come to prominence 
specifically in the state of Uttar Pradesh and formed the majority governments of 1993 
and 2003 led my Mulayam Singh Yadav as the Chief Minister. Currently, the Chief 
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Minister and the face of the SP in Uttar Pradesh is Akhilesh Yadav, son of Mulayam 
Yadav (Samajwadi Party, 2012). Table 2.1 below shows a brief timeline of prominent 
events leading up to the current political state of the SP, while table 2.2 shows the SP’s 
success in the Lok Sabha and Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections from the years 1993-
2002. 
Table 2.1 Timeline of SP political milestones 1992-2003 ((Verma, 2004, 1510) 
Year  
1992 In September, Mulayam Yadav leaves 
Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP) and forms 
the SP  
1993 Yadav elected leader of the SP legislature 
party and becomes chief minister 
1996 Yadav wins Mainpuri Lok Sabha sea and 
becomes union defense minister 
1998 Yadav elected as member of parliament 
(MP) for 2
nd
 time 
1999 Yadav leads SP to victory in Lok Sabha 
elections in Uttar Pradesh 
2002 In Uttar Pradesh assembly elections, SP 
wins an impressive 143 seats 
2003 Yadav becomes chief minister for the third 
time 
27 | P a g e  
 
Table 2.2 Seat and vote share of SP in Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in UP 1993-
2002  
Year Lok Sabha UP Assembly 
 Seats Vote % Seats Vote % 
1993 - - 109 17.82 
1996 16 20.8 110 21.8 
1998 20 28.7 - - 
1999 26 24.06 - - 
2002 - - 143 25.41 
(Verma, 2004, 1510) 
The data in table 2.2 shows the overall positive trajectory in vote majority in both the Lok 
Sabha and assembly elections that the SP experienced for nearly a decade. This rise to 
prominence is important to recognize because it lays the framework for analyzing the 
eventual BSP-SP coalition in 1993, with Mulayam Yadav as chief minister.  
Why did the BSP and SP form a political coalition? 
 While there are a myriad of reasons that political parties engage in the process of 
forming coalitions, the 1993 alliance between the BSP and SP was simply a matter of 
increasing the political power of both parties. BSP leader Kanshi Ram was quoted as 
saying “The reason why I concluded an alliance with Mulayam Singh Yadav is that if we 
join our votes in Uttar Pradesh we will be able to form the government” (Jaffrelot, 1998, 
p. 43). This type of political philosophy is directly related to Kanshi Ram’s assertion that 
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Dalits should take each and every opportunity to exert influence and power in the arena 
of party politics in order to be in a position to effect change. The 1993 assembly elections 
saw the SP win 109 seats out of 425, while the BSP won 67 (Election Commission of 
India; Verma, 2004, 1510). Additionally, the BSP attained 11 out of a total of 27 
ministerial portfolios (Jaffrelot, 1998, 43). 
BSP-SP Relations 
 The harmonious stages of the BSP-SP relationship did not last very long. As time 
went on, both parties began to attempt to execute their own political party agendas at the 
expense of cohesion and mutualism. The first such sign of discontent occurred primarily 
due to the largely divided interests between the OBCs and SCs whose differing interests 
are chiefly represented by the SP and BSP, respectively (Srinivasulu, 1994, 2585).  
Dissension rose in regards to issues concerning land ownership, wages of agricultural 
laborers.  
Due to the BSP-SP victory, lower caste groups had become more assertive and 
self-confident. This led to a dramatic rise in atrocities committed against Scheduled 
Castes in the state of Uttar Pradesh, backlash inflicted by the higher castes as a result of 
the potential for the rise and recent heavy politicization of Dalits, SCs, and OBCs 
(Jaffrelot, 2003, 411). This staggering rise in reported atrocities from 4,200 in 1984 to 
14,966 by 1995 further divided the two parties (Tatu, 1991, 31).  
Leaders within the BSP felt that not enough was being done to protect Dalits and 
atrocities continued to rise, culminating during a period of four months in 1994 when 21 
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Dalit casualties occurred while attempting to install Ambedkar statues in various parts of 
Uttar Pradesh (Jaffrelot, 2003, 412). SP leader and chief minister, Mulayam Singh 
Yadav, also established many openly close relationships with BSP dissidents and 
persuaded many to leave the BSP for the SP (Singh, 2002, 245). On June 2
nd
, 1995, the 
BSP officially dissolved its political alliance with the SP (Jaffrelot, 2003, 412).  
Ideology vs. Political Action 
 While BSP-SP relations began to fail shortly after the formation of the political 
coalition, evidence suggests that the pressures and dissension had little effect on the BSP 
going against its ideology. In fact, one of the main reasons for the conflict between the 
two parties was the BSP’s insistence on standing behind its core values and principles, 
and this was reflected through the actions the party took from 1993-1995.  
 One of the main pieces of evidence confirming the BSP’s efforts in implementing 
its ideology was how its leaders confronted both the opposing Bharatiya Janata and 
Congress parties, as the party tried to push for the implementation of the stipulations in 
the Mandal Report. The Mandal Commission Report was a mandate that served to 
identify the socially or educationally backward by adopting caste as the measure for 
determining social and educational backwardness (Sakrikar, 1994). The commission 
developed various social, educational, and economic criteria shown in table 2.3. The 11 
indicators established by the commission were significant in that they provided the Indian 
government with a more comprehensive and thorough definition of backwards castes in 
India. The criteria established by the Mandal Report would then later be used to introduce 
a system of reservation, in which those identified as members of a backwards caste, 
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would benefit from a 49.5% quota for governmental positions and educational 
institutions.  
Table 2.3 Standards established by Mandal Report for determining backwardness 
Social Educational Economic 
Castes considered as 
socially backward by others 
Castes where the number of 
children ages 5-15 who 
never attended school is at 
least 25% above the state 
average. 
Castes where average value 
of family asset is at least 
25% below state average 
Castes which mainly 
depend on manual labor for 
their livelihood 
Castes where student 
dropout rate amongst ages 
5-15 is at least 25% above 
the state average 
Castes where number of 
families living in kachcha 
houses is at least 25% 
above state average. 
Castes in which the 
percentage of married 
women below 17 is 25% 
above state average 
Castes amongst whom the 
proportion of matriculates is 
at least 25% below state 
average 
Castes where the source of 
drinking water is beyond 
half a kilometer for more 
than 50% of households 
Castes in which the 
participation of females in 
work is at least 25% above 
the state average 
 
 
--  
Castes where number of 
households having taken a 
consumption loan is at least 
25% above state average.  
(Sakrikar, 1994) 
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 Despite the fact that Kanshi Ram publicly stated that there was no ideological 
reason for a BSP-SP alliance, and how it was a mere vehicle to attain more influence in 
Uttar Pradesh politics, both parties teamed together to vehemently oppose the Congress 
and Bharatiya Janata Party’s attempts to block implementation efforts (Jaffrelot, 2011, 
544). The BSP remained consistent with its ideological principles concerning social 
transformation throughout the political process when they strongly supported the 
implementation of reservations for the backwards castes.  Moreover, a large reason that 
the BSP-SP coalition fell out was due to the BSP feeling slighted by the SP, as the SP 
attempted to take sole credit of many legislative actions completed by BSP leaders.  
These measures established by both BSP and SP legislators included reservations 
in schools, appointments of Urdu teachers which was highly popular with the minority 
Muslim voters, and lastly giving jobs in the police force and public accounts committee 
to those of backwards castes (Verma, 2004, 1512). While the SP cornered the BSP and 
took the lion’s share of the credit, the BSP remained persistent throughout and effected 
the type of tangible change reflective of social transformation that is so heavily 
emphasized within its ideology and the party’s constitution.  
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Chapter 3: The BSP- Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) Alliance 
 Directly after ending the political coalition between themselves and the SP, the 
BSP forged a political alliance with the BJP. This was a monumental moment for the 
BSP, as the newly formed BSP-BJP government elected Kumari Mayawati as chief 
minister of Uttar Pradesh on June 3
rd
, 1995 (Jaffrelot, 1998, 46). The BSP-BJP alliance, 
similar to that of the BSP-SP coalition, did not have anything to do with ideological 
interests. Kanshi Ram publicly stated “we can take the help of the BJP to advance our 
national agenda. We feel that the upper castes will be more amenable to social 
transformation than the intermediate castes” (Jaffrelot, 1998, 47).  
The BSP benefited from the coalition because they were able to effectively 
establish themselves as the lead party in Uttar Pradesh, its home state. The BJP tactfully 
joined the alliance in order to establish a strong split between the SP and BSP, who if had 
stayed united, would have made the BJP largely irrelevant in Uttar Pradesh. This would 
have had negative effects on BJP’s national agenda, and hampered its efforts to gain a 
larger degree of central power (Brass, 1997, 2404).  
Who are the BJP? 
 The BJP views Uttar Pradesh as an important state, a vehicle through which it can 
exert its influence in Delhi. The party has been highly successful at the national level in 
the past, has conservative Hindu roots, and favors economic liberalization. While the 
BSP focuses almost entirely on social transformation, the BJP favors a wider, broader 
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approach towards its issues. In Uttar Pradesh, the chief issues that BJP politicians attempt 
to discuss when campaigning are good governance and creating policy deeply rooted in 
nationalism (table 1.2). The BJP’s objective is to build India as a strong and powerful 
nation and help facilitate a progressive, modern, and enlightened society drawing 
inspiration from its cultural roots with an emphasis on a Gandhian approach to socio-
economic issues (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2012). Table 3.1 below displays the BJP’s 
performance in the Uttar Pradesh’s assembly elections from 1989 to 2012, years that 
coincided with a rise in BSP prominence. 
Table 3.1 BJP performance in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections from 1989-2012.  
Year Contested Won FD Votes % of 
Total 
Votes 
Vote % in 
Seats 
Contested 
1989 275 57 153 4,522,867 11.61 18.11 
1991 415 221 41 11770214 31.45 31.76 
1993 422 177 20 16637720 33.3 33.3 
1996 414 174 13 18028820 32.52 33.31 
2002 320 88 50 10776078 20.08 25.31 
2007 350 51 146 8851199 16.97 19.62 
2012 398 47 229 11371080 15 15.21 
(Election Commission of India) 
The data presented in the table shows a clear decline in BJP success at the state 
level in Uttar Pradesh. The data gives numerical insight as to perhaps why the BJP 
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decided to engage in a political coalition with the BSP on multiple occasions. The 
coalition resulted in a mutualistic relationship where both parties win, while each of their 
individual agendas can be carried out.  
Ideology vs. Political Action 
 Chapter 2 showed that the coalition between the BSP and SP did not affect the 
BSP’s efforts in attempting to push for legislation that favored the lower caste despite 
considerable opposition, a critical aspect of BSP ideology. When examining the BSP-BJP 
coalition, the role of chief minister Kumari Mayawati cannot be ignored, as she 
aggressively promoted the interests of the scheduled castes in Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati’s 
tenure as chief minister during the 1993 BSP-BJP coalition played an integral role in 
creating a consistent and loyal voter bank.  
 One of Mayawati’s first actions was to rename universities, local districts, 
stadiums and other public spaces to reflect the history and culture of the scheduled caste 
struggle (Jaffrelot, 1998, 47). In addition, Mayawati placed dozens of statues of Bhimrao 
Ambedkar throughout the state, whose social work, philosophy, and grassroots work 
were of great influence to the BSP (BSP, 2012). Mayawati placed these statues of 
Ambedkar to symbolically impose a sense of BSP and scheduled caste power, while also 
attempting to irk the upper class (Jaffrelot, 2011, 561).  
 During the first four and half months of her first tenure as chief minister of Uttar 
Pradesh, Mayawati expanded various programs that appealed strongly to the scheduled 
caste population. Perhaps the most important action taken by Mayawati was the changes 
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her administration made to the existing Ambedkar Villages Scheme. The program 
granted special funds for socioeconomic development for a period of one year to villages 
who qualified if they had a scheduled caste population of at least 50 percent (Jaffrelot, 
2011, 561). In June 1995, Mayawati changed the standards from at least 50 percent to a 
mere 22-30 percent, which resulted in a total of 25,434 official Ambedkar villages 
(Jaffrelot, 2011, 561). Due to this re-classification, many villages now had increases in 
funding that eventually provided for new roads, water pumps, and houses.  
The implementation of this policy was essential for establishing the important 
consistent voter bank that the BSP enjoys today, and more importantly the scheduled 
caste population was receptive and appreciative that a government was finally going to 
large lengths to ensure that their condition was improved (Pai, 2002, 129). Table 3.2, 
organized by type of minority group in Uttar Pradesh, shows the numerous new measures 
granted under Mayawati’s BSP-BJP coalition government.  
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Table 3.2 Minority-specific measures enacted by BSP-BJP coalition government under 
Mayawati  
Minority Group New Measures 
Scheduled Castes  -Renaming of major institutions and 
regions to those related to the SCs 
 
-Expansion of Ambedkar Villages Scheme 
to increase accessibility to funding. 
 
-Infrastructural improvements in villages 
 
-Increase in education grants 
 
-Social rehabilitation programs 
OBCs -Implementation of quotas 
 
-Allocation of 27 percent of state budget to 
improving the OBC condition. 
 
-Land reform 
Muslims -Increase in student grants 
 
-Reservations for low caste Muslims 
 
-Allocation of 8.77 percent of state budget 
for Muslim grievances 
 
(Jaffrelot, 1998, 47-48) 
The fact that this expansion of Ambedkar villages and finances was under the 
direct supervision of Mayawati, indicates that the BSP did not have to sacrifice its agenda 
and ideology due to the coalition. The BSP regards its ideology as “a movement for 
ending exploitation of the weaker sections and suppression of the deprived through social 
and economic change” (BSP, 3). An assertion can be made that the true motivation 
behind the Ambedkar Villages Scheme was simply to consolidate the voter bank by 
showing swift BSP action.  
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While that surely may have played a part in loosening the standards set for 
receiving the title of “Ambedkar village”, the effort on behalf of the BSP and the 
programs’ resulting success cannot be disregarded. Within four and half months, the BSP 
began to immediately show signs of high political efficacy. More importantly, the BSP-
BJP coalition had no effect on the BSP’s efforts to translate its verbal promises into 
positive, tangible changes for its constituents, despite BJP opposition towards some of the 
new policies.  
The BSP-BJP government lasted only 136 days, as the BJP officially withdrew 
support after just a little over four months as a result of both the rapid modifications to 
pre-existing legislation and the implementation of new measures that were unpopular 
with BJP officials (Duncan, 1999, 43). Instead of altering its strategy of social 
transformation to accommodate the strategic opinions of the BJP, the BSP simply 
regrouped and stood alone in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections and gained 20.6 percent of 
the vote share, in hopes of further executing their policy agenda (Election Commission of 
India). The BSP-BJP coalition did not result in a major change in BSP ideology.  
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Chapter 4: The BSP, Change, and 
Ideology- An AICC Perspective 
 For years, the All India Congress Committee (abbreviated AICC), commonly 
referred to as Congress, was the preferred and dominant political party in Uttar Pradesh 
(table 1.1). Congress is one of the most recognized and accomplished national parties in 
Indian history, its roots as far back as Mahatma Gandhi’s civil disobedience movements 
during the Indian struggle for Independence (AICC, 2008). The party was at the forefront 
of major political negotiations with the United Kingdom leading up to eventual Indian 
independence on August 15
th
, 1947 (AICC, 2008). Congress’s constitution states the 
primary objective of the party is “the well-being and advancement of the people of India 
and the establishment in India, by peaceful and constitutional means……in which there is 
equality of opportunity and of political, economic and social rights….” (AICC, p. 1)1. 
Previous chapters attempted to determine whether the BSP had shifted or 
sacrificed its ideology as a result of the political alliances it formed using information 
gathered and studied from scholarly articles, books, and statistical data. This chapter 
however, will attempt to answer the same research question through an interview 
conducted by myself with a prominent member of the Congress party.  
                                                          
1
 There is a lack of information regarding the year the source was published. For purposes of clarification, 
the parenthetical (AICC) refers to the All India Congress Committee’s constitution. 
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Interviewee Profile 
 The individual interviewed has asked that he remain anonymous. This study will 
refer to him simply as “A.K.” and he has been heavily involved in Congress for nearly 
two decades. A.K. has contested multiple elections in his district in Uttar Pradesh against 
candidates from parties including but not limited to, the SP, BJP, and BSP. He is highly 
informed of the political history, demographics, culture, and political trends in the state of 
Uttar Pradesh, as well as being heavily experienced in the nuances of election 
campaigning in the state. A.K. was specifically selected for this interview due to the 
difficulties his campaigns have experienced in winning elections due to the rising 
influence of the BSP, and various other ethnic-based parties. His experiences as a 
politician representing Congress in Uttar Pradesh can provide a unique perspective on the 
BSP, its evolution, and its ideology. The interview follows a typical question and answer 
format.  
Interview of Congress party member “A.K.” 
Q: Do you think that over the years, the power of Congress has diminished in Uttar 
Pradesh? 
A: Yes, it definitely has. We have seen the lower caste and Dalit vote bank move to 
the BSP, and Congress has lost it. It was not always like this. Congress used to be an 
important party for the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh for many years. It is becoming 
difficult to gain that vote bank back for Congress. 
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Q: As you are familiar, the BSP often engages in alliances with other parties that have no 
ideological connection. Do you feel that this will be harmful to the BSP in the long run? 
A: If you are referring to the alliances made with parties such as the BJP and 
Samajwadi party, then I would say yes. Once, the Congress made a seating 
arrangement with BSP. But, the ideology of BSP has been compromised by doing 
these alliances. The BSP is not big enough to have a majority on its own. When the 
BSP won in 2007 for the Assembly elections, they did so only because they realized 
that they had to change.  They had to change so that they can gain majority and this 
was done when they moved away from the core vote bank to gain majority. 
Q: The BSP strongly advocates social transformation as the main issue in its party 
platform. How does congress respond to voters that claim that it does not cater as much 
to the interests of lower castes, as the BSP does.  
A: We have done a lot for lower castes. If you look at the history of Congress, 
Congress was not just a party. We started as a movement; it was a party for all in 
the beginning, starting with Gandhiji. It was a movement based on equality for all.  
Q: Then what led to the eventual shift in voter preference? 
A: This was because Congress was compromising its own ideology in UP. The 
system that became from this favored the upper castes. As the time went on, upper 
caste got the upper hand.  
Q: Some literature that I have come across regarding BSP ideology has shown that 
specifically, Mayawati has attempted to change the social structure of UP, for example 
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her reservation policies. As an experienced member of Congress what are your thoughts 
on this? 
A: I think that she has gone against Kanshi Ram’s philosophy. Kanshi Ram’s was 
very broad based in his policy. He wanted to get support of all different kinds of 
lower castes. Mayawati’s policies in UP have caused divisions within the Scheduled 
Castes. You are looking at the things she’s done like the quotas. See, but you have to 
also look at how she is slowly shifting away from the original Kanshi Ram ideology. 
She has started to favor Chammars much more recently and this has split the low 
castes.  
Q: Do you think that engaging in political coalitions affects the BSP’s ability to properly 
implement its ideology? Do you believe the BSP feels pressure to implement its partner 
party’s ideology instead, in terms of the BSP having to engage in “chamchagari”? 
A: When they started yes, but not anymore. They are a very dominant 
force…Important and very dominant in UP. Now the national parties are like a 
chamcha to them, whether it be Congress or BJP. 
Q: When I’m doing my research I read some statistics and they say that, Dalits who are 
older in age, they continue to prefer Congress, whereas the younger generations tend to 
prefer BSP. Do you think there is a reason for this? 
A: In our agenda, we always talked about uplifiting of Dalits. But when the younger 
generation grew up, they realized that it was a benefit to them much more to go with 
the majority caste than just any lower caste. That’s how the original founder of the 
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BSP, Kanshi Ram started this movement. It was called BS-4. See, he said that the 
Dalits are not getting their due and stuff like that, he collected the whole Dalit 
society and then picked up….in fact Mayawati has damaged the whole agenda of 
Kanshi Ram. Because Kanshi Ram used to talk about Dalits in general, you know 
not particularly picking up on any particular caste. But Mayawati is a Chammar, 
and she just talks about Chammars. That’s why there is a division in the Dalits also.  
Q: Do you think that the rise of ethnic parties in UP, such as BSP, is becoming a threat to 
congress at the central stage? 
A: See, UP is a very important state, and UP gives 80 MPs to the Lok Sabha. It’s a 
very crucial and politically important state. And obviously the reason parties like 
BSP or SP, which has damaged Congress only because they are eating our core vote 
bank. Whether it is BSP or SP. SP has taken the Muslim vote bank. BSP has taken 
away the Dalit vote bank. Congress is basically right now, a party without a core 
vote bank. That’s the problem, Congress is damaged and affected. When we used to 
be in government in UP, our majority used to be much more.  
 
Examination of Interview Commentary 
 Congress party member A.K. places special emphasis on vote banks and how the 
rise of ethnic and caste based parties has caused a traditional national party such as 
Congress to be weakened and left without a core vote bank. A.K. also asserts that the 
BSP has now become a more fragmented party in its Scheduled Caste base after enjoying 
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higher levels of unity in its initial stages. He essentially argues that the 2007 BSP victory 
in the state assembly, while monumental for BSP since it gained power without the need 
for an alliance with another party, demonstrated a severe shift from original BSP 
philosophy developed by Kanshi Ram.  
While the methodology employed in investigating BSP ideology throughout the 
study has been focused around BSP legislative action, A.K. brings up an intriguing point 
in that the broadening of the BSP voter base should be considered as sacrificing ideology 
for votes and power.  Interestingly however, is the fact that such attempts to broaden 
voter base have occurred in the absence of a BSP political alliance, and instead during 
BSP attempts to branch out on its own to become a more independent party rather than 
when in a coalition. The next chapter focuses entirely on the BSP’s 2007 UP state 
Assembly victory, will take into consideration the assertions made by Congress member 
A.K., and will also exploring the differences between BSP actions pertaining to ideology 
when the party engages in political alliances versus when it does not.  
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Chapter 5: The BSP as a Single-
Handed Majority 
 May 11
th
, 2007 marked a monumental moment in the history of Indian politics, as 
the BSP was voted to power as a single-handed majority in Uttar Pradesh’s state 
assembly elections (Verma, 2007, 2039). Mayawati’s victory was the first time that a 
Dalit-led party emerged victorious in state elections without participating in a coalition 
government (Sengupta, 2007). Previous chapters in this study focused on the political 
alliances that the BSP engaged in with the SP and BJP, and whether or not those alliances 
affected BSP ideology. Chapters 2 and 3 established that neither the BSP-SP coalition nor 
the BSP-BJP coalition affected the BSP’s ability or motivation to implement its ideology 
in the form of legislation aimed at improving the Scheduled Caste condition.  
 This chapter will serve as a control in the study. The interview conducted in 
chapter 4 with A.K., a prominent member of the Congress party, suggested that BSP 
ideology has indeed changed in recent years. While analysis of coalitions with the SP and 
BJP produced no significant evidence to suggest that the alliances affected BSP ideology, 
would the case be different if the BSP was not participating in a coalition government?   
BSP Strategy, Performance, and Political Action in the 2007 Uttar 
Pradesh Assembly Election 
 In previous elections, the BSP consistently used caste as the focal point of its 
campaign efforts, focusing solely on the interests of the lower castes and minorities such 
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as SCs, OBCs, and Muslims. This was a successful strategy in the party’s early stages in 
attempting to develop a consistent vote bank (A.K., 2013). Table 1.4 displays the BSP’s 
consistent upward rise in terms of overall percentage of votes claimed in Uttar Pradesh 
assembly elections, which coincided with the party’s early strategy of mobilizing lower 
caste votes. Table 5.1 below shows the BSP’s electoral performance for the year 2007 in 
the assembly elections. The BSP won a majority of 30 percent without the help of an 
outside party or joining any official political alliance. 
Table 5.1 BSP performance in 2007 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections 
Contested Won Vote (%) 
402 206 30.46 
(Verma, 2007, 2039) 
 When campaigning for the 2007 election, the BSP shifted its electoral strategy. 
While the BSP did advocate its usual caste dominated political aspirations, it instead used 
the idea more of as a metaphor in order to create and cement grassroots alliances. These 
grassroots efforts were built heavily on the premise of showing that the concerns of lower 
castes were valued by the party just as much as the concerns of other communities (Gupta 
and Kumar, 2007, 3388).  
 Mayawati began to reach out to the Brahmans in order to put forth an 
understanding that the BSP was willing to listen to their concerns and grievances, while 
being fully confident that the party would not lose the support of the lower caste by 
engaging in political dialogue with upper castes (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3388). One 
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major indicator of a shift in BSP policy was the fact that throughout the entire 2007 
election campaign, Mayawati did not commit herself to Mandal policy. Mandal policy 
refers to the various proposals concerning reservations and quotas that would improve the 
conditions of the lower caste from an economic and social standpoint (see chapter 2 
“Ideology vs. Political Action” for details of the Mandal Commission). This indicated 
that the BSP was clearly sensitive to the perceptions of the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh 
and began to think about the party’s potential to hold power in the long run. In fact, the 
party decided against issuing a manifesto for the 2007 state elections in order to allow 
Mayawati more flexibility in amassing a more diverse support network for the BSP 
(Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3390).  
 Another indicator of shifts in BSP ideology and strategy was the changing of BSP 
slogans. In the early 1990’s the main slogan was as follows, and was directed at the upper 
castes, who were painted as the enemies and the oppressors: 
(1)“tilak, tarazu aur talwar, inko maro jutey char” (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3390) 
The above slogan essentially berates the three symbols of Brahman and upper caste 
superiority (tilak, tarazu, and talwar). Another famous BSP slogan that was used 
consistently shortly after the party’s inception was the following: 
(2) “85 percent living under the rule of 15 percent, this will not last, this will not 
last” (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3390) 
Now let us examine one of the main political slogans during the 2007 election campaign, 
a more integrative slogan 
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(3) “haathi nahin, Ganesh hai, Brahma, Vishnu, Mahadev hai” (Gupta and Kumar, 
2007, 3390) 
 (4) “haathi badhta jayega, brahman shankh bajaega” (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 
3390) 
These quotes instead paint a very different picture of the BSP’s view on the upper 
caste. Quote 3 states that it is not about just the elephant (BSP symbol), but that one is 
also a part of a broader Hindu spectrum. This slogan intends to push for more unity 
between different castes. Slogan 4 essentially states that the elephant will continue to rise 
and the Brahman will signal it. These slogans display how the BSP began to shift its 
Scheduled Caste dominated agenda to increase the depth of their voter bank, something 
that the party’s founder, Kanshi Ram, was against (Jaffrelot, 1998, 37).  
Baichara Banao Samitis (Brotherhood Building Communities) 
 Mayawati continued to channel her new enthusiasm for creating a larger, more 
diverse vote bank by creating the Baichaar Banao Samitis, which are essentially 
committees to promote work between the higher and lower castes (Gupta, 2009, 21). 
Each of the 403 assembly constituencies had one committee which contained 300 
Brahmans and 100 Dalits, with a Brahman chairman and a Dalit general secretary (Gupta, 
2009, 21). Mayawati’s plan began to work because as the upper castes began publicly 
favoring the party, the lower castes began to rapidly throw even more support, thereby 
increasing the vote bank and not limiting it to merely SCs, some OBCs, and a minority of 
Muslims.  
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While Mayawati’s newfound support for Brahmans was not with any particular or 
official political party, it essentially served the same purpose. The BSP was able to attain 
power by broadening its previously narrow base of supporters, and the Brahmans 
benefited by attaining positions of power in her government. Despite gaining this 
majority and winning office, enthusiasm waned for Mayawati’s newfound philosophy 
because while the main bulk of her supporters were Dalits and lower castes, the promises 
made by Mayawati concerning social transformation were truly made for the poor among 
the upper castes (Gutpa, 2009, 22).  Table 5.2 below numerically shows the rise in upper 
caste support for the BSP. The BSP essentially shifted its philosophy from Bahujan to 
Sarvajan, along with an ideological shift from exclusive to inclusive and reaped the 
benefits at the expense of its ideology (Verma, 2007, 2042). 
Table 5.2 BSP and caste-wise support in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections 1996-2007 
Castes/ 
Communities 
                       Percentage of Voters 
 
 
1996                           2002                             2007 
Dalits 62 69 77 
OBCs 13 20 27 
Muslims 12 10 17 
Upper Castes 4 5 16 
(Kumar, 2007, 2238) 
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Conclusion 
 Kanshi Ram once aimed to transform the BSP into a major political force that 
would cater directly to the interests of Dalits and other lower castes in India. Nearly three 
decades later, it can be seen that the BSP has succeeded politically. With humble 
beginnings, the BSP has now become a powerful political party with a strong and loyal 
voter bank, most notably in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The whole purpose of creating the 
BSP was to politically mobilize the weak, exploited, and oppressed lower castes in India, 
and to work to improve their situation and standing in a social, political, and economical 
context.  
 In order to consolidate this consistent and loyal voter pool, the BSP adhered very 
strictly to its ideology in its early stages. Aware that their party was too weak to attain 
majority by itself, the BSP engaged in political coalitions with the Samajwadi Party and 
Bharatiya Janata Party, both parties that differed from the BSP ideologically. This study 
posed the question of whether engaging in these political coalitions, caused the BSP to 
shift its ideology. The analysis shows that yes, engaging in political coalitions did indeed 
cause the party to shift its ideology over a long period of time, but not directly because of 
coalitions.  
 First, there was the BSP-SP alliance. While the two had nothing in common 
ideologically, both parties understood that an alliance would put them in a powerful 
position in the state politics of Uttar Pradesh. The alliance still saw the BSP put into 
motion numerous provisions and acts to help improve the condition of lower castes in the 
50 | P a g e  
 
state. Second, there was the BSP-BJP alliance. This coalition government did not hinder 
the BSP, as it rejected opposition from BJP members and went through with a series of 
economic and social provisions. These provisions included quotas, reservations, and 
increased funding for Ambedkar villages throughout Uttar Pradesh.  
Lastly, the singular BSP state government of Uttar Pradesh in 2007 was studied, 
and this is when the most notable changes to BSP ideology occurred. The BSP changed 
party slogans, policies on reservations, and introduced a variety of measures to appeal to 
the upper caste in an attempt to broaden its one-dimensional voter bank that at the time 
was comprised mainly of Scheduled Castes, OBCs, and a minority of Muslims in the 
state.  
The analysis establishes that the BSP initially stayed very firm to its ideology 
even when engaging in political coalitions, in order to create a dependable and stable 
voter bank. Once the BSP confirmed that it had established enough political popularity 
and authority in the state of Uttar Pradesh, it began to shift ideology towards a more long- 
term and all-encompassing approach. It was not the BSP’s participation in coalition 
governments that directly resulted in changes in ideology, but rather using those 
coalitions as ladders to build power, influence, and party identity. Once the BSP’s 
political power in Uttar Pradesh was confirmed through its early success, the party then 
had the luxury to shift its ideology starting in the 2007 state assembly elections of Uttar 
Pradesh, and begin to shift its agenda towards broader electoral support. All of these 
ideological changes occurred due to an underlying ambition within members of the party, 
to one day establish the BSP as the majority party at the national level.  
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